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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
was motivated by personal malice. Lt. Mann then briefly examines
three situations in which the majority rule might be applicable.
In combat or under conditions of war in a theater of operations is
the first situation that is considered as to a soldier's liability. The common law recognized the right of the military forces to make certain
necessary invasions of personal interests and rights to successfully prosecute the war and that view is still in force today. From both adjudicated cases and authorities of the subject it seems to be the weight
of judicial opinion that in combat or in actual theaters of operations a
soldier may be absolved from civil liability for executing an order which
it was illlegal or perhaps even criminal to give if such order was given
by a superior officer.
During peacetime or during non-combat operations the situation
is changed considerably and the consensus is that the soldier's liability
in acting in obedience to orders emanating from superior sources is
comparable to the liability of a peace officer acting in a similar situation.
The third situation that is considered is that during insurrection or
under martial law. Under the general rule, which Mann points out must
be qualified in many jurisdictions, an insurrection or rebellion does not
vary the position of a citizen or deprive him of the protection of the
common law. There are, however, many variations of this general rule
with the adjudicated cases falling within two extremes: one line of cases
favoring the soldier and the other favoring the civilian. It is apparently
a judicial impossibility to reconcile these two extreme views and it appears that this problem will remain with the soldier as long as he is in
uniform. Recognizing the situation, many states, as well as Congress,
have passed statutes that exempt the soldier from certain types of civil
liability and the Federal statute is the most embracing of all the legislative attempts to help solve the soldier's dilemma.
Francis J. Paulson.

RECENT DECISIONS
CHEMICAL PATENTS -

VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT.-Dow Chem-

ical Company v. Halliburton Oil Well Chemical Company, 65 S. Ct.
64.--This was an infringement suit brought by the Dow Chemical
Company against the Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company involving the alleged infringement of the Grebe-Sanford patent No.
1,877,504, of which the Dow Company, petitioner, was the assignee.
The conflicting views of two federal appellate courts concerning the
validity of this patent led the Supreme Court to entertain certiorari.
139 F. (2) 473; 81 F. (2) 495.
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The essence of the Grebe-Sanford patent was the introduction into
depleted, low-yield oil wells of a solution of hydrochloric acid under
pressure, with fresh water being added later to force the acid further into the subjacent limestone formations, thus releasing from the limestone
additional oil embedded therein. This hidden oil, thus released, would
permit the resumption of pumping on a profitable basis. Another specification of the patent proposed the use of a small amount of inhibiting
agent (an arsenic compound) to check the corrosive effect of the hydrochloric acid on metallic surfaces. The patent expressly acknowledged
the existence of the so-called Frasch patent, No. 556,669, but sought
to distinguish this alleged invention therefrom on three grounds, viz:
(1) The addition of a corrosion inhibiting agent; (2) The use of a
dilute rather than a concentrated hydrochlbric acid solution (5 to 20
percent concentration as against 30 to 40 percent in the Frasch patent);
(3) The use of an ordinary pump tube to convey the acid to the bottom of the well hole instead of the smaller and specially protected supply tube contemplated in the Frasch patent.
Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, gave play to many considerations in the law of chemical patents, and the opinion affords a
clear insight, without being hypertechnical, into the broad principles
underlying the determination of this type of case.
The Court took the position that no one of the three above mentioned claims or combination thereof evidenced a degree of skill and
ingenuity which constitutes the essential ingredient of an invention, as
defined in the statute.
Dealing first with the inhibiting agent, the Court observed that its
only purpose was to prevent or restrict the corrosive effect of the acid
on the metal well tubing and equipment; that long before the patent in
question was issued, inhibiting agents were in general use to protect
metals from acid solutions. "The Grebe-Sanford method, in short, involved in this respect no more than a mere application of an old
process'of inhibition to a new and analogous use of protecting metal
well equipment from corrosion when the well is being acidized to increase production. Such a process lacks the very essence of an invention. * * * He who is merely the first to utilize the existing fund of
public knowledge for new and obvious purposes must be satisfied with
whatever fame, personal satisfaction or commercial success he may be
able to achieve. Patent monopolies with all their significant economic
and social consequence are not reserved for those who contribute so insubstantially to the fund of public knowledge."
The petitioner placed great stress on the fact that the Grebe-Sanford
process suggests the use of a dilute hydrochloric acid solution, as distinguished from the greater concentration specified in the Frasch patent.
In disposing of this contention the Court said: "Petitioner claims that
the dilution recommended by the Grebe-Sanford process substantially
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reduces the viscosity of the acid, greatly slows its reaction on limestone
(thus allowing the acid to open up channels distant from the well hole
instead of spending itself immediately on the nearby rock) and greatly
reduces its corrosive action on iron and steel. * * * But * * * the

mere addition of water to dilute a known chemical solution does not
entitle one to a patent monopoly, at least unless a definite dilution
point or range is discovered corresponding to a physical phenomenon.
* * * No such discovery was made here. The advantages said to accompany a dilute solution do not correspond to any particular dilution
point or range."
The "ordinary pump tube" argument as advanced by the petitioner
was branded by the Court as "a mere substitution of equivalents which
do substantially the same thing in the same way. * * *" To the petitioner's allegation that the Grebe-Sanford process had filled a long felt
want and had been a commercial success, the Court said: "But these
considerations are relevant only in a close case where all other proof
leaves the question of invention in doubt. * * * Here the lack of invention is beyond doubt and cannot be outweighed by such factors."
The Court held that the patent was invalid for want of invention,
therefore making it unnecessary to rule on the infringement aspect.
This case, determined adversely to the petitioner, reflects a general
inclination toward "tightening up" by the federal courts in their consideration of the validity of chemical patents which are in substance
mere adaptations of older combinations and processes, as in the instant
case.
David S. Landis.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

STATE POLIcE POWER

REGULATION

OF

LABOR ORGANIZERS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT.-Thomas v. Col-

lins, 89 Law. Ed. 340, 65 Sup. Ct. Rep. 315.--This case, involving
R. J. Thomas, U. A. W. president and CIO vice president, has had a
considerable play in the public press due to the prominence of the actor
and his affiliation as well as the time of the act. To recount the facts
briefly, Thomas went to Texas in connection with a drive for workers
put on by a Texas affiliate of CIO. His intention was to speak and be
on his way, but a short time before he was scheduled to speak he was
served with a restraining order that had been issued ex parte by the
District Court of Travis County which sits at Austin, 170 miles from
Houston; hence the order was issued in anticipation of the speech and
not subsequent to its rendition. This order had been issued in pursuance of section 12 of House Bill No. 100 of the 48th Legislature, 1943.
An effort by the state of Texas to regulate labor unions and their activities by requiring registration of all avowed organizers with the Secretary of State.
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Disregarding the order on advice of his attorneys, Thomas proceeded
to make the speech and asked persons to join the union generally as well
as one man specifically. For this he was held in contempt and sentenced
to a short imprisonment. He filed a petition for habeas corpus. His petition was denied and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas the judgment was affirmed. On further appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States the Texas Court was reversed.
The majority opinion of the Court was delivered by Mr. Justice
Rutledge with Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and Jackson concurring. After stating the issues and pleadings of the parties, Mr. Justice
Rutledge continues: "The case confronts us again with the duty our
system places on this Court to say where the individual's freedom ends
and the state's power begins ....
The preferred place given in the constitutional system to the freedoms secured by the last amendment gives
such liberty a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions,
and it is the character of the right not of the limitations which determines what standards govern the choice.
"Any attempt to restrict free speech or free assembly must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but
by clear and present danger, and the rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil curbed which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due process grounds will not suffice.
.. . That the state has power to regulate labor unions with a view to
protecting the public interest is, as the Texas court said, hardly to be
doubted. They cannot claim special immunity from regulation. Such
regulation, however, whether aimed at fraud or other abuses, must not
trespass upon the domains set apart for free speech and free assembly.
... Thomas went to Texas for one purpose and one only to make the
speech in question. Its whole object was publicly to proclaim the advantages of worker's organization and to persuade workmen to join
Local No. 1002 as part of a campaign for members .... That there was
restriction upon Thomas' right to speak and the rights of the workers to
hear what he had to say there can be no doubt. The threat of the restraining order, backed by the power of contempt, and of arrest for
crime, hung over every word. . . . That Thomas chose to meet the
issue squarely, not to hide in ambiguous phrasing, does not counteract
this fact.... The restrictions' effect, as applied, in a very practical sense
was to prohibit Thomas not only to solicit members and memberships,
but also to speak in advocacy of the cause of trade unionism in Texas,
without having first procured the card . . . as a matter of principle a
requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would
seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech
and free assembly.... The restraint is not small when it is considered
what was restrained. The right is a national right, Federally guaranteed.
There is some modicum of freedom of thought, speech and assembly
which all citizens of the Republic may exercise throughout its length
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and breadth, which no State, nor all together, nor the Nation itself, can
prohibit, restrain or impede."
Mr. Justice Jackson concurring said in part: "Texas did not wait
to see what Thomas would say or do. I cannot escape the impression
that the injunction sought before he had reached the state was an effort
to forestall him from speaking at all and that the contempt is based
in part at least on the fact that he did make a public labor speech."
Mr. Justice -Douglas concurring said in part: "No one may be required to obtain a license in order to speak. But once he uses the economic power which he has over other men and their jobs to influence
their action, he is doing more than exercising the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment. That is true whether he be an employer or an employee. But as long as he does no more than speak he
has the same unfettered right, no matter what side of an issue he
espouses.'
The dissent by Mr. Justice Roberts, was joined in by Mr. Justice
Reed and Mr. Justice Frankfurter .... In part: "The question before us

is as to the power of Texas to call for such registration within limits precisely defined by the Supreme Court of that state in sustaining the statute
now challenged.... The Act and the injunction which he disobeyed say
nothing of speech; they are aimed at a transaction, - that of solicitation
of members for a union. This, and this only, is the statutory object which
is said to render it unconstitutional.... Stripped to its bare bones, this
argument is that labor organizations are beneficial and lawful; that
solicitation of members by and for them is a necessary incident of their
progress; that freedom to solicit for them is a liberty of speech pro.
tected against state action by the 14th Amendment and the National
Labor Relations Act, and hence Texas cannot require a paid soliitor
to identify himself." The opinion concluded with the query whether
or not it is the Supreme Court's job to pass on a state statute or to
read another interpretation into it which would in effect overthrow its
effect.
The importance of this decision may be well understood when it is
viewed in the light of present and possible post war state legislation and
on it may hinge the validity of many union activities.
John D. O'Neill.

WAR---MILITARY JURISDICTION OvER CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF WAR

DEPARTENT.-Perlstein v. United States, 57 Fed. Sup. 123 (1944).A recent case particularly interesting to civilian employees accompanying the armed forces into conquered and occupied territory was Perlstein
v. United States in which military jurisdiction was successfully invoked
against a civilian employee. The petitioner had appealed to the ap-
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pellate court for a writ of habeas corpus but the upper court refused to
issue the writ. The facts of the case may be stated briefly:
Petitioner was employed by a salvage company under contract to
the United States to do work in Massaua, Eritrea. A provision in his
contract provided that his employment might be terminated by the
Army at any time and that the company was under obligation to pay
his transportation and subsistence back to the United States if his services were cancelled by the Army. He was discharged and ordered to
leave Massaua by ship. Before he left the country he committed larceny
and forgery and subsequently was arrested by a British constable at
Port Tewfik and was brought before a General Court-Martial for trial
at Heliopolis, Egypt where he was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen
years at hard labor. The Judge Advocate Department later reduced the
sentence to ten years and from this judgment the petitioner sought a
writ of habeas corpus.
The jurisdictional grounds invoked to prosecute the defendant were
found in Article of War 2(d), 10 U. S. C. A. which provides:
"Persons subject to military law ... (d) All retainers to the camp
and all persons accompanying or serving with Armies of the United
States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and in
time of war all such retainers and persons accompanying or serving
with Armies of the United States in the field, both within and without
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, though not otherwise
subject to these articles."
Petitioner based 'his writ on three contentions. The first was that
the Army was not "in the field" in Eritrea at the time. The court, however, pointed out that Massaua was vital as a supply line and that in
1942 it was subject to the possibility of Italian uprisings since it was
an occupied country. It pointed out that an army occupying Italy itself would certainly be an army in the. field and an army occupying
Eritrea, one of Italy's colonies, would also be an army in the field.
The second contention of the petitioner was that since his employment had ceased he was no longer accompanying the army. The court
answered this by pointing out that a person may still accompany an
army despite the fact that his period of employment may have ended.
The third contention of the petitioner was that the military authorities had no legal right to try him in Heliopolis, Egypt. This argument
was met by the court pointing out that once the military jurisdiction
attached, it was not material where the court martial was actually held.
With an ever increasing number of civilian employees following and
accompanying the armies into occupied territories, questions like those
decided in the instant case will assume more importance and in answering them courts will unquestionably be called upon to make nice distinctions involving the legal rights of such employees.
Francis J. Paulson.
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IVAR -

RIGHT OF RETURNING VETERANS TO REINSTATEMENT IN

JoBs.-Kay v. General Cable Corporation- September, 1944, 144
F. (2d) 653.-The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 as
amended by the Service Extension Act of 1941 provides that any person who, upon entering the military or naval service of the United
States, has left "a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer" shall, in the case of a private employer, be restored to such position or to a position of like seniority status and pay,
"unless the employer's circumstances have so changed as to make it
impossible or unreasonable to do so."
The plaintiff entered the service of the defendant as medical director
on the basis of a full working week at its plant. Six months later this
was reduced to three hours a day, although he remained on call by the
company at any hour of the day or night and was expected to visit
injured employees at their homes or at the hospital. Outside the plant,
he maintained his own office where he received his private patients but
where he was required also to wait on persons from defendant's company. He later left his position to enter the Army and was discharged
after six months of duty. He applied to the defendant's company for his
former position but was turned down and he then petitioned the court
to compel the defendant's company to reinstate him.
The court awarded plaintiff the judgment and compelled the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff. The main argument on behalf of the
defendant consisted in the fact that the doctor who took the place of
the plaintiff spent his full time on the job, whereas the plaintiff spent
only one-half of his time at the defendant's company and that therefore the plaintiff must be considered a part time employee as construed
under the Service Act of 1940. The court, however, took the liberal
viewpoint and decided that men and women returning from military
service find themselves in countless cases, in competition for jobs with
persons who have been filling them in their absence. Handicapped, as
they are bound to be by prolonged absence, such competition is not
a part of a fair and just system, and the intention was to eliminate it
as far as reasonably possible. The Act intends that the employee should
be restored to his position even though he has been temporarily replaced
by a substitute who has been able, either by greater efficiency or a more
acceptable personality, to make it desirable for the employer to make
the change a permanent one.
OLD

Theodore M. Ryan.

